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11. Introduction1
Across Western Europe, the twin processes of the national and the industrial
revolutions have constituted “critical junctures” determining subsequent political
development, and have led to long-term alignments between social groups and
political parties. In Lipset and Rokkan’s model (Lipset, Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 2000),
the national and the industrial revolutions have each resulted in the formation of two
cleavages. These historical cleavages, in processes lasting to the end of the 19th and
the beginning of the 20th centuries have given birth to the modern party systems in
Europe. Subsequently, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have famously noted, the full
mobilization of European electorates led to a “freezing” of the major party
alternatives. The basic structure of European party systems has thus proved
remarkably stable throughout much of the 20th century.
As the historical record shows, existing cleavages condition the room for the
emergence of new conflicts. Thus, while the class cleavage has proved to be
universally polarizing across Western European countries, its character and strength
vary considerably from country to country according to the configuration of the older
cleavages and the loyalties and identities that they entailed (Rokkan 2000: 277-412,
Bartolini 2000: Ch. 8). In taking this line of reasoning further, Kriesi and Duyvendak
(1995) have postulated a zero-sum relationship between old and new political
conflicts. If this assertion is correct, identifying the structuring power of the
traditional cleavages in a given country allows an assessment of the potential for the
manifestation of new political oppositions.
The aim of this paper is to differentiate between several types of cleavages and
divides that leave varying space for the articulation of new lines of division. In a
preliminary step, this requires adressing a number of open theoretical questions which
derive from certain ambiguities within the cleavage concept. Over the past decades, it
has been widely debated whether the classical cleavages identified by Lipset and
Rokkan have maintained their structuring power or if their force is veining. While
contrasting results may be partly due to the respective methodological choices,
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2differences in approaching the question also tend to reflect diverging understandings
of the cleavage concept itself, and in particular of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) famous
„freezing“-metaphor. My first aim is therefore to show how diverging readings of the
freezing-hypothesis are at the heart of the controversy as to how strong the traditional
cleavages frozen into place in the 1920s remain today. The mayor opposition lies in
an understanding of the freezing hypothesis in terms of the stability of party systems
on the one hand, and in terms of the stability of the social structural basis of party
competition on the other.
A first strand of literature proceeds „top-down“ and examines parties’ adaptation to
new societal demands and structures, helping us to make sense of what oppositions
currently reflected in a party system are about. Authors such as Kitschelt (1994) can
be subsumed in this category. Such an approach has the drawback of loosing sight of
the role of long-term political identities and the question of how they relate to new
political oppositions or conflicts. Another strand of literature, exemplified by most
electoral research, proceeds „bottom-up“ and examines the social structural and
attitudinal basis of party choice (e.g., Evans 1999). Both approaches fail to
accommodate within their models the interaction or clash of established political
identities and new political conflicts which transform the political contents of the
existing cleavage structure.
The main purpose of this paper then is to develop an analytical model which
addresses these shortcomings by relating structural cleavages to the political issues
around which party competition evolves at a given moment. This results in a typology
of cleavages combining three elements: The distances in parties’ issue-positions
across a divide, the degree of divergence in the preferences of the voters of these
parties, as well as the stability of voter-party alignments. Segmented cleavages are
characterized by deep issue-specific divergences and a strong closure of the social
groups opposing each other. When divergences between both parties and voters are
low, identitarian competition characterized by strong social closure can be
distinguished from competitive political dimensions, where parties compete for
similar constituencies and party loyalties are minimal. Finally, if parties are not
responsive to the preferences of voters, several types of party system cartellization can
be identified.
3My ultimate aim is to identify structures of opposition favouring the success of
right-wing populist parties across Europe. The focus of this paper is more theoretical,
however, and I provide an empirical application of the model to a singe country,
France. Starting in the late 1970s, I analyse the conflicts structuring oppositions
within the French party system and from this derive predictions concerning the
mobilization space for challengers to the established parties. My primary focus is on
the effects of varying structures of opposition. For reasons of space, I omit a
discussion of the underlying potentials that have contributed to the rise of right-wing
populist parties, which I have discussed elsewhere (Bornschier 2005).
The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides a discussion of
how cleavages gain stability, and then seeks to accommodate political change with
this interpretation. After a review of existing research, I propose to lay particular
emphasis on the collective identity element of cleavages that has been unduly
neglected in most treatments of the concept. More particularly, I draw on social
psychology to develop tools to theoretically and empirically grasp the role of
collective identity in stabilizing alignments and in leaving varying space for the
mobilization of new conflicts.
In the third section, I propose a schema that differentiates between different types
of alignment, from which hypotheses can be derived concerning the mobilization
potential for right-wing populist parties. In the final section, the model is applied to
France. To empirically determine the positions of parties along the dimensions
structuring political oppositions, I rely on data based on a sentence-by-sentence
coding of the media coverage of election campaigns. This data has been assembled in
the research project in which I am involved (see Kriesi et al. Forthcoming). To
analyse the correspondence between parties and voters, as well as the stability of
alignments, I rely on post-election surveys for four elections, 1978, 1988, 1995 and
2002. The late 1980s and the 1990s can be considered the crucial phase concerning
the rise of right-wing populist parties. The analysis of the election of 1978, on the
other hand, serves as a point of reference in a period in which the potentials favoring
the populist right had not yet materialized.
The empirical analysis reveals the existence of an economic and a cultural axis of
conflict within the French party system. Structures of opposition on these two axes
prove to be important predictors for the rise of the Front National.
42. The Stabilization, Perpetuation and Transformation of Cleavages and
Political Alignments
„Despite more or less thirty years of close reading by countless scholars in a
variety of different fields, and despite what is now a genuinely voluminous
literature seeking to explore and often test the ramifications of the so-called
»freezing hypothesis«, there still remains a marked degree of confusion about
what precisely was believed by Lipset and Rokkan to have settled into place by
the 1920s” (Mair 2001: 27).
According to the definition of Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213-220), a cleavage can be
conceptualized as comprising three elements: (1) An empirical element, which
anchors it in social structure, (2) an element of collective identity of this social group,
and (3) an organizational manifestation in the form of an organization or collective
action of those concerned. Going beyond these three constituting elements, it seems
that the term cleavage is usually reserved for relationships that exhibit a certain
stability. A cleavage constitutes a durable pattern of political behavior linking social
groups and political organizations. This pattern is reproduced over generations of
voters, and possibly beyond the conflicts which originally brought the respective
parties into being. Lipset and Rokkan had noted that the crucial characteristic of
Western competitive politics was that “the party alternatives, and in remarkably many
cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of national electorates”
(1990 [1967]: 134).
A cleavage is a political structure in David Easton’s terms, who states that
“structure is a property of behavior” (1990: 43). Cleavages entail collective political
identities and organizational loyalties which are not easily broken down or diluted by
new political movements. The space for new political conflicts is thus conditioned by
the existing cleavage structure. The relationship between the last of the four historical
cleavages and the three historically older ones illustrates this nicely. The class divide,
contrary to the other cleavages, has proven to be universally polarizing, and is found
in all European countries. But despite representing the main commonality of
European party systems, its impact has been far from uniform in across countries. On
the one hand, this is due to the country-specific opportunities for alliances with other
political movements. More directly relevant for the present discussion is the fact that
the class cleavage’s strength as well as the make-up of its social basis have been
heavily determined by the older cleavages and the loyalties and identities that they
5entailed (Rokkan 2000: 277-412, Bartolini 2000: Ch. 8). Workers’ parties thus found
their mobilization space constrained by prior mobilization efforts of the religious,
nationalist and agrarian political movements.
The formation of the class cleavage, and the fight for universal suffrage on the part
of the workers’ movements which it entailed in most countries, then completed the
mobilization of European electorates. As a consequence of the already existing links
between social groups and political organizations, new political movements found
their mobilization space heavily restrained after the establishment of universal
suffrage. Virtually all social groups had established links to political parties and these
links were stabilized by collective political identities of the groups divided by a
cleavage. Lipset and Rokkan have referred to this as the “narrowing of the support
market” for political parties, which is concomitant to the “freezing” of the major party
alternatives (Lipset, Rokkan 1990: 134-5).
As Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995: 5-10) have noted, this results in a zero-sum
relationship between old and potentially new cleavages. The greater the degree of
social closure of the groups separated by a cleavage, and the less pacified the conflicts
associated with this cleavage, the smaller the mobilization potential of new conflicts.
Differing interpretations of the “freezing-hypothesis”
Contrary to the analysis of the genesis of European party systems, the mechanisms
accounting for their ensuing long-term stability have not been analyzed in detail in the
original Lipset-Rokkan article, and not in Rokkan’s later work either, now collected in
a single volume (Rokkan 2000). Although a careful reading does reveal hints
regarding this question, it did not represent the authors’ primary question of interest.
As Mair (2001) argues, the “freezing-hypothesis” was not really a hypothesis, but
rather an empirical observation: The basic structure of party systems had remained
remarkably stable between the 1920s and the 1960s, and even thereafter, as we know
today, surviving profound societal transformations.
Empirical tests of the continuing validity of the freezing-hypothesis have
proceeded along two main lines, as Mair (2001: 28-33) points out. As we will see,
they are based on differing interpretations of what exactly “froze” into place in the
1920s: (1) A first possibility is to track the evolution of cleavages, which is the
6strategy pursued by scholars studying the social structural basis of voter alignments.
In Bartolini’s (2000: 24) words, the focus here is on the social homogeneity of the
structural basis of cleavages. Mair (2001: 30) criticizes this approach on the grounds
that it starts from the unrealistic assumption that the hypothesis could only be correct
if society itself is “frozen”. Since social structure has evidently changed a great deal
since the 1960s, the long-term stability of party systems, revealed by Bartolini and
Mair’ (1990) analysis, must be due to something else than stable patterns of linkage
between social strata and political parties.
Hence, if party systems are stable despite an evolving society, then this can only be
accounted for by the forming of new links between social groups and parties which
compensate the natural process of structural dealignment, which is due to the
declining number of religious and working class voters. This is in fact the reasoning
put forward by Evans and his colleagues (Evans 1999). But if the cleavages have been
profoundly transformed, then it hardly makes sense to apply the freezing-metaphor to
the cleavages themselves.
(2) The second strategy is to focus on the stability of party systems formed by the
historical cleavages. Most of the work focusing on aggregate levels of electoral
stability using measures of volatility falls into this category, such as Bartolini and
Mair’s (1990) study. This perspective seeks to explain the persistence of parties
beyond the conflicts that originally brought them into being, and evolving links
between social groups and parties are at least implicitly taken as a given. They are not
problematic, quite to the contrary: In Mair’s (2001) account, for example, a long-term
transformation of cleavages is actually the only possible explanation for the stability
of party systems evidenced in Bartolini and Mair (1990), and helped parties survive in
a profoundly changing environment.
A partial explanation for the confusion as to the exact meaning of the freezing
metaphor may actually lie in the influential definition of a cleavage put forward by
Bartolini and Mair, which can only be read as putting great emphasis on the social
structural homogeneity of parties’ electorates. However, in other instances, the
authors themselves are much less strict in their understanding of cleavages. This
applies to Mair’s (1997) later work as well as to Bartolini (2000), who accepts a long-
term decline in the social structural homogeneity of a party’s electorate as quite
natural. Hence, Bartolini and Mair’s definition, emphasizing the social structure-
7collective identity-organizational linkage, seems much more adequate to analyze the
conditions for the initial mobilization of cleavages than for answering the question to
which degree historical cleavages structure politics today.
Since studying the contemporary political relevance of cleavages is my ultimate
aim, I will therefore argue that it does not suffice to focus on social structure and on
the stability of partisan alignments, but that we also have to identify the concrete
conflicts and how they are interpreted and processed along the lines of historical
antagonisms reflected in cleavages.
Party systems and the perpetuation of cleavages
Upon closer reading, Lipset and Rokkan’s original formulation of the freezing
hypothesis seems to conform more to the second interpretation just discussed than to
the first. The passage most frequently quoted from their article in this context is the
following:
„The narrowing of the »support market« brought about through the growth of mass parties
during the final thrust towards full-suffrage democracy clearly left few openings for new
movements. Where the challenge of the emerging working-class parties had been met by
concerted efforts of countermobilization through nationwide mass organizations on the liberal
and conservative fronts, the leeway for new party formations was particularly small; this was
the case whether the threshold of representation was low, as in Scandinavia, or quite high, as in
Britain” (Lipset, Rokkan 1990: 135).
This passage conforms to the interpretation that the freezing-metaphor does not refer
to the cleavages themselves, but to the party systems. Lipset und Rokkan (1990: 134)
actually refer to the „freezing of the major party alternatives“, and not the Cleavages
themselves. They explicitly state, „[…] the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with
few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s“ (ibid, emphasis
mine).
A frozen party system is thus equivalent to a structurally consolidated or
institutionalized party system, in Sartori’s (1976, 1994) terms. The stronger a party
system structures the expectations of actors over time – at the elite as well as at the
mass level – the more it contributes to channelling old and new conflicts into
8established structures of competition. Mair also suggests such a nexus between
expectations and structuration:
„Predictability then becomes a surrogate of structuration: the more predictable a party system
is, the more it is a system as such, and hence the more institutionalized it has become. This is
also what freezing is about“ (Mair 2001: 38).
With the full mobilization of electorates in the 1920s, the mayor social groups had
developed links to political parties that represented them in the national centre of
decision-making. Large parts of the population had developed political identities and
group attachments to one of the forces which had led the way in the establishment of
political organization: Those in the periphery joining in the resistance against the
central nation-building culture on the basis of their ethnical, linguistic or religious
identities; those who saw their religious identity endangered by the centralizing and
standardizing nation state; those who opposed industrial interests because they saw
their interests as members of the agricultural sector threatened; and, finally, the
organization of the working class fighting for political incorporation and material
equality, leading to the counter-mobilization of the opposed class interests (Rokkan
2000).
These established loyalties to the parties mobilizing on behalf of social groups
formed an important part of citizens’ political identities, understood here as those
social identities which are politically relevant. Social identity refers to those parts of
an individual’s identity which are derived from their identification with various social
groups (Tajfel 1981). The struggles around the mobilization and counter-mobilization
of the interests that had brought the party systems into place rendered highly salient
these political identities, and thus left little room for subsequent political mobilization.
To the degree that conflicts evolve around the political questions directly linked to
the original cleavages, politics is likely to reinforce and sustain the underlying
collective identities, and thus the attachment of individuals to these collectives. The
structure of conflict represented by the party system thereby perpetuates the collective
identifications underlying the cleavage structure. As Sartori (1968) has argued, for
example, objective class positions are not automatically transposed into politics. It
requires a class collective identity at the group level, and the development of a group
9attachment at the individual level.2 After the initial mobilization of this opposition, the
conflicts carried out within the party system between working-class parties and those
defending the interests of the upper classes served to reproduce this group
identification on the part of voters.
However, it needs to be emphasized that it is not a working class party alone that
keeps alive the subjective class-consciousness of the social constituency that once led
to the mobilization of that party. Without an antagonist, this identification would lose
much of its political relevance, and not being refreshed, would open the way to
identifications on the basis of some other group membership. It is thus not parties
themselves that reproduce collective identities, but the conflicts they carry out with
other parties. In other words, it is the party system, defined as a „[...] system of
interactions resulting from inter-party competition“ (Sartori 1976: 44) that reproduces
collective identities.
Political space can thus be imagined as structured by parties taking certain
positions along the historical dividing lines. Cleavages being reflected in the party
system, it is the interaction of the parties that reproduces the identities tied to
cleavages. Contrary to the argument put forward by Campbell et al. (1960: Ch. 7) and
Converse (1969), then, it is not so much the long-term identification of social groups
with a specific party which accounts for the stability of a party system over time, but
much rather the stability of the patterns of interaction between parties that perpetuates
political alignments. Accordingly, party identification appears as the product of a
genuinely political socialization process.
Party systems then reproduce themselves over generations as new voters are
socialized into the existing structure of interaction, and come to interpret politics in
terms of the prevailing pattern of oppositions. Thus, the configuration of the axes of
conflict within a party system represents something like a cognitive schema that helps
individuals to make sense of politics. A schema can be conceived as a „cognitive
structure of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific
instances that guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored
information“ (Conover, Feldman 1984: 96). According to the authors, one of the roles
of schemas is to generate expectations against which reality is compared (ibid, p. 97),
                                                 
2 Here, I draw on Klandermans and de Weerd’s (2000) discussion of the relationship between group
attachment and collective identity.
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much like the notion of a frozen or an institutionalized party system developed in the
preceding section.
In the absence of patterned interactions, the, the party system provides no cognitive
schema for the interpretation of politics. Sartori (1976: 244-248) has argued that
parties that do not exhibit this regularity in interaction – “fluid polities and quasi-
parties”, as he calls them – do not constitute a system at all. Accordingly, no stable
links between social constituencies and parties exist, and levels of volatility from one
election to the next can be very high, indicating the absence of any form of
structuring. Examples for such constellations are absent in Western Europe, but the
experience outside Europe – looking at the different types of party systems in Latin
America, for example – demonstrates that veritable party systems are the product of
cleavages, and do not develop in other historical contexts.3
The notion of a socialization within a party system as a cognitive schema then
helps to explain why cleavages, once formed, are so resistant to change, and how they
can persist beyond the immediate conflicts that have brought the system into being in
the first place. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 218) put it, they offer individuals already
existing alternatives for their social identities and political integration.
However, this does not mean that there is no change in the content of the conflicts
carried out between parties. On the contrary, as Mair (1997) has insisted, the historical
party organization’s remarkable resilience over time is precisely due to their ability to
adapt to structural and cultural changes. Thus, while new political issues are for the
most part interpreted and processed in terms of the established structure of conflict,
there is by no means stability in the content of conflict. Structures of oppositions may
resemble those produced by the historical cleavages, but it is not the cleavages or the
original conflicts as such that are perpetuated, but the shape of the party system.
At this point, it is obviously necessary to move from identities anchored in social
structure and tightly bound to the social groups – whose mobilization initially
produced a cleavage structure – to more genuinely political identities, which are
partly a product of politics itself. This interpretation is in line with Sartori’s (1968)
dictum that we have to conceive of the party system as an independent variable
between the domains of social structure and politics.
                                                 
3 For an account of the historical formation of Latin American party systems, see Coppedge (1998)
and Dix (1989).
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At a fine level of analysis, then, the partisan camps divided by a cleavage consist
of social groups that have been mobilized into this opposition by virtue of the
homogeneity of their life chances, their religious world-view or their sectoral
interests. Represented in the party system, however, are broader patterns of
opposition, which are the result of multiple alliances between social groups in
opposition to those with opposing interests or ideologies.
At this higher level of abstraction, where we move from the political organization
of social groups to political articulation and interaction within a party system, the
more particularistic identities based on attachments to social groups are meshed into
broader political orientations. These can be termed „political cultures“, as generalized
orientations towards politics (Almond and Verba 1963: 13, Eckstein 1996). It has
repeatedly been pointed out that such very basic clusters of values and ensuing value
identities are antagonistically related to one another. Wildavsky (1987: 7) refers to
this as a „necessity theorem“, according to which „conflict among cultures is a
precondition of cultural identity“ (Wildavsky 1987: 7). Similarly, Coser (1956) has
emphasized the group-binding functions of conflict. Hence, the established patterns of
interaction within a party system serve to stabilize the collective identities underlying
the dividing lines within the party system.
Upon closer inspection, Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) study provides evidence
exactly for this concerning the class divide: Studying the volatility between the blocs
of the left and the right, their focus is not on the stability of alignments of specific
social groups, but on the stability of one specific opposition within the party system,
which is the fruit of the historical class cleavage.
The transformation of cleavages: Collective identities and realignments
If most new conflicts are somehow absorbed into the established structure of conflict
without altering it, this does not mean that a party system will be capable of
channelling all conflicts around new political issues. Whether or not this is the case,
depends on whether or not they are reconcilable with the predominating antagonisms,
or if they cut across them. If new issues divide the same social groups as those already
prevailing, they will simply be taken up by parties and will result in a somewhat
altered meaning or political content of the dominant lines of conflict within a party
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system. However, if parties’ established electorates are divided concerning a new
issue or an issue that was hitherto of minor salience, parties will try to avoid
positioning themselves regarding this question. In general, the temptation of parties to
try to attract new voters by positioning themselves regarding controversial issues is
tempered by the risks inherent of such a strategy.
I take this to be the background of Schattschneider’s (1975) dictum of organization
being the “mobilization of bias”, every form of organization being receptive to some
conflicts but not to others. In times of “normal politics”, the system is not particularly
responsive to new issues, because the established cleavage structure tends to
“organize” issues cutting across established lines of division “out of politics”, in
Schattschneider’s (1975: Ch. 4) famous words.
This situation can change in phases of realignment. If new issues cannot be
integrated into the existing structure of conflict, and if one of the parties within the
system takes them up, the other parties will have to take sides as well, and chances are
that linkages between social groups and political parties are reconfigured. While old
connections are weakened in a process of dealignment, new and salient issues may
lead to the formation of new linkages. The latter processes are at the heart of the
theory of political realignments (Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984, Martin 2000, Mayhew
2000).
Small realignments may occur continuously, but according to Martin’s (2000)
reformulation of the theory, when party systems adapt to new structures of conflict,
this is usually a rather eruptive process, and can be traced to a number of “critical
elections” characterized by higher levels of volatility accompanying the modification
in parties’ constituencies. This is precisely due to the inherent inertia of party systems
as a consequence of their freezing along historical antagonisms, and the fact that they
are not very responsive to new demands of the populace in times of “normal politics”.
The latter in the theory of realignment denotes phases where the system is stable and
where the prevailing alignments are not altered, despite events such as corruption
scandals and economic crises affecting the relative strength of parties in the short run.
Hence, following Martin (2000: 84-86, 422-427), we can distinguish three levels
influencing patterns of party competition, along with the theories laying primary
emphasis on them:
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(1) The long-term evolution of social structure, which is the primary focus of
cleavage-theory. Here the focus is on the critical junctures, such as the national
and industrial revolutions, which heavily influenced political development in a
path-dependent function. Claims have been made that similar revolutions have
been witnessed since that time: The educational revolution of the 1960s and
1970s (Allardt 1968), as well as the processes of globalization and
Europeanization that have intensified since the 1980s and 1990s (Kriesi et al.
Forthcoming), and which can be interpreted as processes leading to a political
de-structuring as a consequence of the removal of national boundaries
(Bartolini 2004b).
(2) These developments do not translate directly into new antagonisms within the
party system due to the force of existing alignments and the freezing of party
systems along the historical divides. The established parties will seek to avoid
the entry of new parties by responding to new potentials within the electorate.
The adaptation of the existing structure of conflicts to new political potentials
is the central focus of the theory of political realignments, where the
weakening of prevailing alignments opens the way for the establishment of new
links between social groups and political parties.
(3) The lowest level is that of everyday politics. Here, cyclical issues of minor
importance, corruption scandals and the popularity or unpopularity of
politicians and governments affect results of elections. However, these events
rarely affect the two higher levels of political development.
In a restructuring of oppositions in a party system, levels one and two interact and
therefore have to be analyzed jointly. A weakening of the grip of the established
structure of conflict on voters is a precondition for a process of realignment to occur.
As already pointed out earlier on, a dealignment can either be structural and
behavioural (e.g., Martin 2000, Lachat 2004). In the case of structural dealignment,
modernization leads to a long-term change in the strength of social groups and hence
in the make-up of society. Here, developments on level 1, the long-term evolution of
social structure, impinge upon the second level, that of realignment-theory. For
example, the advent of a post-industrial economy has led to a shrinking of the
traditional working class, while secularization has led to a decline in the share of
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regular churchgoers in Western European countries. As a consequence, the traditional
strongholds of Social Democrat and Christian Democrat parties have lost in electoral
importance. Hence, a party system reflecting primarily these conflicts will be less
anchored in society than a few decades ago, opening a window of opportunity for the
mobilization of new conflicts.
Processes of behavioural dealignment, on the other hand, are not necessarily
connected to a gradual shift in the strength of social groups. Here, the links to political
parties or to ideological blocks formed by cleavages undergo change as a consequence
of the rising importance of new political issues or the advent of a new dimension of
political conflict. If the policy or value positions of an ideological block and its voters
no longer match, or if the electorate considers the political offer to be out-dated, the
established links between parties and voters become fragile. A miss-match between
the positions of parties and voters means that alignments may remain stable for some
time due to habit, as long as voters do not redefine their political identity, but most
likely, a realignment will occur.
A process of realignment in this case requires a redrawing of individual’s personal
group attachments. Drawing on Stryker’s (1980, 2000) identity theory, new
identifications can be conceived as standing in direct competition with established
group attachments, and much therefore depends on the latter’s salience. Behavioural
realignments are therefore possible only as a consequence of a gradual transformation
in individuals’ salience hierarchy of identities.4 For example, it can be hypothesized
that the advent of a post-industrial economy, or the long-term trend of secularization
has led to a withering of working-class and religious identities, creating a widening
window of opportunity for the mobilization of new conflicts.
Behavioural dealignment can, however, also be a consequence of politics itself. If
political identities depend upon conflict with opposing identities, as stated above, the
decline of conflict between parties along any one cleavage will lead to a gradual
weakening of the group identities underlying it. As a consequence, other identities can
ascend in the salience hierarchy of identities. These can be existing identities, which
were supplanted by the salience of new group attachments. Older group attachments,
suppressed by the mobilization of the cleavages outlined by Lipset and Rokkan
(1967), may re-emerge. However, the fading of the identities linked to the traditional
                                                 
4 The notion of salience hierarchy of identities is laid out by Stryker (1980: 60-1, 2000).
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cleavages also opens space for the emergence of new identities. Here, the possibilities
of deliberate forging of new identities are subject to the limits of objective social or
political similarities characterizing the members of the group.
How strong traditional alignments remain and to which degree their veining force
has been compensated by new political identities is, of course, an empirical question.
Taking Kitschelt’s (1994, 1995) influential claim of the transformation of the classic
left-right cleavage as a starting point, I will argue that what is needed to answer these
questions is a model which links ongoing political disputes and conflicts with the
long-term political identities reproduced by the party system.
3. A combination of “bottom-up” and “top-down”-approaches
If the political relevance of the historical cleavages in the disputes carried out in
European party systems is to be assessed, this requires the introduction of an
additional element beyond the social structural and collective identity elements of
cleavages, namely, an analysis of the policy content of current oppositions. Are these
conflicts still related to the historical cleavages? And if this is the case, to which
degree do political alignments reflect the continuing impact of the historical cleavages
and to which degree are they the product of realignments? Such an analysis requires
reconciling two approaches to the study of cleavages, namely, the opposition between
those approaching the question „bottom-up“ and those proceeding „top-down“.
„Top-down“ approaches. Kitschelt’s (1994) analysis, which takes new political
issues as a starting point, can be considered a „top-down“-approach. As the author
reveals, the opposition between left and right has been profoundly transformed since
the 1970s as a result of a value conflict between libertarian and authoritarian
conceptions of community, which corresponds to the materialist vs. post-materialist or
the so-called „old politics“ vs. „new politics“ opposition (Inglehart 1977, 1997, Offe
1985, Ignazi 1996, Flanagan, Lee 2003). As a consequence, it is quite doubtful if it is
legitimate still to speak of the traditional class cleavage. If we take Bartolini and
Mair’s (1990) three-fold definition literally, and applying it not only to the initial
mobilization of conflicts, but also as a tool to analyse partisan alignments in later
stages of political development, then the class cleavage has – in part, at least – given
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way to a new opposition. Hence, while Bartolini and Mair’s analysis reveals a
remarkable stability of party systems along the left-right opposition, it is left open if
this stability is due to a persistence of the underlying cleavage, or, what is in fact more
plausible, to its profound transformation.
“Bottom-up” approaches. Studies examining the social structural basis of
cleavages, on the other hand, are often inexplicit as to whether or not they are
examining the traditional cleavages or possible new structural oppositions, as I have
argued. Those of them who do find politics to have a structural basis today (e.g. Evans
1999) seem more concerned with this fact as such, and pay less attention to the
question how these oppositions relate to the historical cleavages, and what the policy
antagonisms are about which have lead to the new alignments they discover. More
than offering a test of the strength of the historical cleavages, then, such an analysis of
the cleavage concept as such.
On the other hand, Franklin et al. (1992) explicitly test the structuring power of the
traditional class cleavage, and find the latter’s force to have veined. This, on the other
hand, leaves unexplored the continuing existence of a cleavage as a consequence of its
transformation. Both approaches, then, suffer from the same deficiency: Proceeding
“bottom-up”, from the social structural characteristics of voters to their party choices,
they cannot relate the structural bases of politics to the policy-oppositions structuring
interaction in party system.
Combining “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches. Hence, if the aim is to
detect the interplay between parties’ responses to changing societies and their
electorate’s social structural make-up, then a combination of bottom-up and top-down
strategies is necessary. If we are interested in conflicts leading to a modification of the
cleavage structure, it seems more promising to start off with concrete issue-positions
and then to look for their social structural base. Kriesi (1998) follows such a strategy,
seeking to find a social structural basis of the libertarian-authoritarian value divide by
differentiating within the “new” middle class. However, his results show that while
this more precise conceptualization of social structure explains a lot, the value divide
has an impact beyond this. However, this does not necessarily imply that this
opposition does not have a structural underpinning. Much rather, it means that,
employing the usual instruments used to describe social structure, it has so far not
been possible to detect the new conflict’s structural side (Kriesi 1998: 177).
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One possibility to detect such structures lies in the development of even more
elaborate class schemata, such as that developed by Oesch (Forthcoming). But even if
such instruments fail to detect a conflict’s structural basis, one must be cautious in
claiming that it is altogether absent. After all, a wide array of dividing lines in society
is conceivable, and they are not limited to those divisions that have their origin in the
labour market. As Bartolini (2004a) has pointed out, the term “social-structural” as
the basis of a cleavage “[…] does not point to mere »economic« or »demographic«
criteria, but to the whole range of differentiation criteria of social groups such as
lineage, property, class, education, credentials, power, status.”
What seems most promising, therefore, is to combine an explorative analysis of the
social structural basis of current conflicts with that of the traditional conflicts. In the
following, I distinguish between cleavages and lines of opposition, the latter being
tied to concrete conflicts over policy or ideology carried out by parties, whereas the
former denote the structural foundation of political alignments in historical
oppositions. I will use the term “divide” in a more loose sense to refer to a line of
opposition of which one does not yet know if it also corresponds to a cleavage.
3. Cleavages and Lines of Conflict: A Typology of Alignments
Different types of divide and the emergence of a cultural line of opposition
The question to which degree the traditional or new cleavages structure party
competition is a different problem from assessing the role of a cleavage’s structural
basis in producing partisan alignments. It requires the inclusion of the policy positions
of political parties as an additional element in the analysis. By doing this, it is possible
to differentiate between different kinds of oppositions or cleavages. While some may
be at the centre of political disputes, others presumably have a more identitarian role,
and stabilize alignments because the social groups divided by them share a collective
identity. For example, even if levels of religious voting were to remain high, we can
say little about the nature and political relevance of the links between this
constituency and political actors if we do not know how this cleavage relates to
disputes between parties.
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Distinguishing such situations is crucial for two reasons: First of all, the role of
political identities in structuring political alignments should not be neglected, as it is
often the case in the Downsian tradition (Downs 1957) of spatial theories of party
competition, such as Kitschelt’s (1994) explanation of the transformation of Social
democracy. Secondly, according to the hypothesis developed in the preceding section,
alignments primarily based on group attachments, which lack the reinforcing effects
of visible policy controversies within the party system, leave more room for new
conflicts than those characterized by a continuously high polarization at the party
system level.
Thus, the different types of cleavages and divides distinguished in the following
have varying consequences for the articulation of the new cultural opposition which
has emerged in the 1980s and 1990s and which opposes a libertarian-universalistic
and a traditionalist-communitarian ideological pole. The first conflicts relating to this
axis emerged in the 1970s as a consequence of the mobilization of the new social
movements, and provided new political potentials which Green and Social Democrat
parties have been most successful at mobilizing (Inglehart 1984, Flanagan et al. 1984,
Kitschelt 1994). However, it can be shown that an opposing authoritarian potential
arose at roughly the same time among the populations of advanced industrial
democracies (Sacchi 1998).
Kitschelt and McGann (1995) have perhaps most forcefully argued that the rising
parties of the radical right in the 1980s represent the antipole to the parties of the
libertarian left. Beginning in the 1980s, then, but more clearly visible in the 1990s, it
has been the populist right that has succeeded in setting the agenda on this new
cultural line of opposition (Kriesi 1999, Kriesi et al. Forthcoming). The populist right
can be seen, at least in part, as a countermovement to the libertarian left, and the
values it advocates lie at the opposing end of a continuum spanning from libertarian-
universalistic to particularistic conceptions of community (Bornschier 2005).
While my ultimate aim is to contribute to an explanation for the rise of the new
parties of the populist right, the approach presented in this section is not specifically
focused on this new group of parties, but provides a general model to assess the
chances for new political conflicts to gain room.
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Lines of opposition and cleavages
A line of opposition refers to a polarization which structures party competition in a
given election. Such a dividing line can, but does not necessarily exhibit a
homogeneous social structural base, however defined. Through its tight conjunction
with the policy level of party competition, it denotes something clearly distinct from a
cleavage. First of all, the number of lines of opposition does not necessarily coincide
with that of the cleavages underlying the party system. A cleavage is something we do
not necessarily encounter in everyday politics. Representing a (durable) pattern of
political behaviour of social groups, linking them to specific political organizations, it
cannot be observed without analyzing the social structural basis or the stability of
political preferences of social groups. In principle, a number of cleavages may be
present within an electorate, but not every cleavage finds expression in a separate line
of opposition.
Having detected the relevant lines of opposition and their social structural
underpinnings, we can then compare the social groups that are opposed along the
current lines of conflict with those separated by the traditional cleavages. The match
between the two then allows an estimation of the latter’s influence. Analysing these
lines of opposition makes it possible to combine the “top-down” and “bottom-up”
approaches discussed in the preceding section.
Even if we are to find a new line of opposition that has a structural basis, it can
only be considered a transformed or a new cleavage if it exhibits the latter’s defining
features. Here, I propose to lay primary emphasis on the stability of the links between
social groups and parties, and pay less attention to the social structural homogeneity
of the groups underlying a cleavage. A cleavage structure then denotes a durable
pattern of political behaviour of social groups. In the model presented in this chapter,
I regard the stability of alignments over time as the crucial factor distinguishing short-
term alignments from cleavages. To the degree that we find such durable alignments,
it is highly probable that they represent a transformed or a new cleavage. Unstable
alignments, on the other hand, be they structural or not, are either short-term
deviations from the established patterns of cleavage politics, or a herald of an
unfreezing party system.
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Different types of divides and resulting mobilization potentials for new conflicts
Starting from the assumption that existing alignments condition the room for new
cleavages to emerge, different types cleavage are likely to have variable consequences
for the mobilization capacity of new conflicts. Some of Bartolini and Mair’s (1990:
19-52, 68-95) theoretical considerations provide a good point of departure here.
Similarly to my approach, the authors want to determine to what degree cleavages
represent competitive or identitarian political dimensions. They propose to
differentiate cleavages along two dimensions, namely, salience and closure (see also
Kriesi, Duyvendak 1995). Salience denotes the importance of a cleavage relative to
other divides within a party system, while closure refers to the stability of the social
relationship represented by the cleavage. Together, they condition the stability of
political alignments. A cleavage, according to the authors’ conceptualization, is
important if it structures party preferences to a high degree (relative to other
cleavages) and if voters do not change allegiances for a party on one side of the
cleavage to one belonging to the opposite camp. Focusing on the class cleavage,
Bartolini and Mair compare the levels of volatility between the left and right blocks as
opposed to overall volatility and thereby derive assertions concerning the class
cleavage as well as the other cleavages.
Contrary to such an approach, I propose to analyse every line of opposition or
cleavage separately, focusing on the policy positions taken by parties during electoral
campaigns. Furthermore, I propose to determine the saliency of divides as a function
of the polarization regarding the issues constituting the political content of a line of
opposition. If parties’ positions are far apart on a line of opposition, and if it emerges
as an important conflict in election campaigns, it represents a salient dimension within
the party system. However, the salient political dimensions regarding the oppositions
between parties do not necessarily have to be those that most strongly polarize voters.
A divide can either be salient either within the party system, or on the side of their
voters, or both.
In determining the chances for a realignment to occur as a consequence of a new
dimension of political opposition, the match between the positions of parties and that
of their electorate along a line of opposition is therefore crucial, because it allows an
estimation of the degree to which the party system is responsive to the policy-
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positions of the electorate. Historically, the term cleavage has been reserved for
relationships where political parties represent durable oppositions in the preferences
of social groups. I therefore consider a rough match in the positions of parties and
their voters as a defining feature of a cleavage and use it as a precondition for calling
an opposition a cleavage in the following attempt at categorizing different types of
divisions. Over the long run, a miss-match between the two will presumably lead to
an erosion of the link between partisans and their social constituencies, leading to a
veining of the cleavage, thus opening space for new alignments based on other group
attachments.
Summing up, if an alignment is characterized by coinciding positions of parties
and their voters, and if these alignments are stable over several elections, I take this as
strong evidence for the existence a cleavage, characterized by the existence of a
structural basis and a collective identity on the part of the social groups in question.
This leads to an analytical schema combining three elements: (1) The polarization of
parties’ positions along a line of opposition, and (2) the polarization of parties’
constituencies along a line of opposition. Together, the first and the second elements
allow an estimation (i) of the degree to which the party system is responsive to the
preferences of the electorate and (ii) of the salience of the line of opposition. (3) The
third element is the dimension of closure of the divide in terms of the loyalty between
social groups and parties, as expressed in the stability of party preferences. Stable
preferences indicate closure, while instable preferences are an indication of a fluid
line of opposition or cleavage. Closure gives an indication of the collective identity
component of an alignment. If this component is strong, it will delay the manifestation
of a new opposition even if parties have converged in their positions and if the
conflict is pacified (on this point, see Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995: 5-10).
Figure 1 shows the possible combinations of these three elements. Grey fields
within the figure denote situations of matching positions of parties and voters. The
starting point for analysis is a single dimension structuring political competition in a
particular election in a country. The analysis of a number of elections can reveal either
dominant patterns or evolutions in the types of divides. In the following, I will explain
the content of the cells in Figure 1 and briefly state what the implications of the
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Figure 1:Types of divide: Salience in terms of polarization in programmatic profile
and closure in terms of the stability of alignments.
Starting at the top left of the figure, we find a situation of segmented political
opposition, where the distances between parties are large and correspond to equally
vast distances on the side of the respective electorates. The term segmentation comes
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from the theory of consociational democracy and there denotes deeply rooted
identities such as language or religion. However, following Mair (1997: 162-171), it
can fruitfully be used for any kind of deep political opposition entailing strong
loyalties and party preferences of certain social groups. As a consequence, the
electoral market is tightly restrained and leaves little room for the emergence of new
lines of opposition or new political parties.
At the extreme, such a structure of opposition rules out any real competition
between parties. Political systems characterized by pillarization, where the
Netherlands at least used to be a prominent example, each party has its own
constituency, and they do not really compete at all. Presumably, therefore, this is the
structure of conflict that most strongly inhibits the emergence of a new conflict at the
centre of the party system. Not only is closure high, with parties reflecting the
positions of voters, but also there are no signs of convergence between parties’
positions.
A corresponding case where preferences are volatile is only to be expected in the
case of a new or emerging line of opposition, which has not yet led to the
establishment of firm partisan loyalties. Consequently, new alignments are dependent
on the relative salience of this line of opposition as opposed to importance of other,
older divides in a given election. Summing up, in this category we find on the one
hand established cleavages that have either preserved their salience or have been
reinvigorated by new issues, or, on the other hand, highly salient new divides.
Moving one field to the right, we find the first situation of a miss-match between the
positions of parties and voters. Here, the positions of parties remain polarized, while
those of their electorate do not, which results in what can be called an over-politicized
party system. Supposedly, this is not a very frequent constellation, and is likely only
in two cases: (1) The line of opposition is of secondary importance, alignments being
structured by parties’ positions on other divides. (2) The other possibility is related to
Katz and Mair’s (1995) thesis of party system cartellization. Cartellization can either
refer to the established parties keeping specific issues off the agenda, which will be
relevant later on, or to their ability to inhibit the entry of new competitors due to their
privileged access to state resources. In this second case, which is relevant for cases of
over-polarized party systems, the established parties manage to restrict competition
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within the party system. At the same time, grass root party members or parties’
clinging to their old core constituencies make impossible an ideological moderation.
To the degree that party preferences are stable in the case of an over-polarized
party system, the most probable scenario is that we are witnessing voters still
emotionally attached to an old cleavage, where parties represent out-dated political
positions that are no longer reflected in the preferences of their voters. In the other
case, where party preferences are not stable, the same situation has already led to a
veining of partisan attachments. In these cases, and especially in the second, the
emergence of a new line of opposition is possible either due to the reorientation of an
established party, or to the entry of a new competitor de-emphasizing the established
line of opposition for the benefit of a new one.
In two situations, both the distances between parties, as well as those between voters
are low, resulting in congruence. The first case is that of an identitarian political
dimension as the political expression of a cleavage, where party preferences are
stable, either due to a structural basis of the conflict or as a consequence of strong
sub-cultures or collective identities. In either case, closure remains high due to
enduring group attachments. But since the underlying collective identities are not
reinforced by contrasting programmatic stances of parties, preferences are likely to
remain stable only as long as new oppositions do not gain in importance relative to the
old ones. However, even if this happens, and if the new oppositions crosscut existing
constituencies, the rise of a new line of opposition will at least be tempered or delayed
by the force of existing loyalties.
A competitive political dimension, on the other hand, denotes a kind of competition
that is close to Schumpeter’s (1942) characterization of party competition: Elections
serve to elect competing teams of politicians that try to convince voters on an
electoral market. As Downs (1957) has argued, this results in their targeting the
median voter. Such a model only represents an adequate description of reality if
voters’ preferences do not diverge much. If new potentials were to arise, and if there
were no second political dimension entailing strong party loyalties, newcomers could
in principle find fertile ground. However, since the established parties do not have any
strong links to specific constituencies that keep them accountable, they are relatively
free to re-orient themselves, limiting the chances for challengers to gain success. An
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exception to this scenario would be if the established parties agreed not to address
issues evolving around new oppositions, which would open space for anti-cartel
parties.
I now turn to the cases where electorates are characterized by diverging policy
preferences, which, however, contrary to the situations of segmentation, are not
reflected in a correspondingly large polarization in the positions of parties. Hence, we
are observing a non-responsive party system. This can be the case in two contrasting
situations: Either the established parties have converged along a line of opposition,
although it remains salient for their voters, or a new opposition has arisen, and the
established parties have not yet taken clear positions along a new line of opposition.
Parties can try to avoid doing so for various reasons, for example because they are
internally divided concerning new issues, as it appears to be the case regarding
parties’ stances towards European integration (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming, Bartolini
2004b).
Patterns of conflict of this kind would be evidence for what I propose to call issue-
specific cartellization. This is probably the case most advantageous for anti-
establishment parties to emerge, since they can on the one hand advocate the
programmatic positions that are not represented within the party system, and on the
other hand denounce the other parties for not being responsive to the preferences of
voters. This corresponds to a prominent explanation for the rise of right-wing populist
parties in the 1980s (Katz, Mair 1995, Kitschelt, McGann 1995, Ignazi 2003). If party
alignments are stable, indicating that social closure is high, existing group attachments
will retard processes of realignment. But since the positions of the established parties
are similar, and because no visible policy oppositions or conflicts reinforce group
attachments, existing party preferences can be expected to decline, opening the way
for new conflicts to gain room.
One of the problems involved in the analysis of this last case is that a non-
responsive party system can generate both support for anti-establishment parties, as
well as abstention from voting. For example, right-wing populist parties quite often
seem to recruit their voters from previous non-voters, as the example of the French
Front National shows (Mayer 2002). More generally, Goldthorpe (2002) has argued
that while class voting may be in decline, the relationship between class and non-
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voting may fortify as a result of the processes of modernization and globalization.
Thus, any analysis on the emergence of a new opposition between winners and losers
of modernization should at some stage include non-voters as well. In the empirical
analysis, I take this into account when analyzing the stability of alignments.
The point of departure for the application of the analytical grid developed here is the
party system as a whole in any single election. From there, the analysis can proceed in
two directions. Either aggregated patterns over a number of elections can be sought,
allowing a more adequate assessment of the stability of the relationships found in
individual elections. On the other hand, the analysis can be refined, and the above
schema used to study not lines of opposition, but single parties and sub-groups of
their electorate. For example, the case of an over-polarized party system may only be
relevant for certain groups within an electorate. Particularly in cases of pillarization, a
cleavage may continue to exist, but it is not necessarily relevant to the same degree
for all voters.
In cases of segmented political oppositions there is a certain danger of the party
system not being responsive to those who are not integrated into the prevalent
networks of societal and political opposition. Thus, such a structure of opposition will
only inhibit the emergence of new conflicts if the party system also integrates citizens
lacking strong political identities. In all other cases, the chances for anti-establishment
parties to emerge would appear to be rather high, attracting support especially among
young citizens and those who previously did not vote. To detect such situations, the
schema can be applied to analyse the political behaviour of the various groups
constituting the constituency of a party, and whose links to a specific party can be of
different kinds.
In what follows, I present a first application of this model the France. The aim is to
classify the French party system at four points in time, one in the 1970s and three
between 1988 and 2002. If my premises are correct, the model should provide an
explanation for the emergence of the Front National at the end of the 1970s and the
early 1980s. At the same time, the concepts developed above should help to determine
to which degree the rise of the Front National is a symptom of the emergence of a new
dimension of political conflict that could institutionalize into a new cleavage.
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4. An Empirical Application of the Model: Political Oppositions in
France and the Rise of the Front National, 1978-2002
Determining the dimensionality of political space in the parties’ political offer
To be able to identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition in
elections, I rely on data based on the media coverage of election campaigns in six
European countries. Within the research project in which I participate, parties’
“political offer” has been coded within the two months preceding the election.5 Here, I
use the data on France that covers the elections of 1978, 1988, 1995 and 2002. With
the exception of the 1978 parliamentary campaign, presidential elections were
analyzed. The choice of a parliamentary election for the 1970s is due to the limited
availability of corresponding post-election surveys for the 1970s. For each election,
we selected all articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general during the
last two months before Election Day in a quality newspaper and a tabloid, namely, Le
Monde and le Parisien. The articles were then coded sentence by sentence using the
method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis and De
Ridder 1998 and Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). This method allows a coding of
the relationship between political actors and between political actors and political
issues. The direction of the relationship indicates whether the actor is in favor or
opposed to the issue and is coded on a scale ranging from –1 to +1, with three
intermediary positions. For the present purposes, only relationships between political
actors and political issues are considered, which results in about 8500 sentences used
for the analysis.
Political actors were coded according to their party membership. In France, a
number of small parties were grouped, such as the parties of the radical left and some
smaller center parties were regrouped into the UDF category. For the political issues,
we coded about 400 in the case of France and then regrouped them into 12 broader
categories. This is because the importance of the more specific issue categories may
vary from one election to the next depending on the political agenda, making them
                                                 
5 In France, with the exception of the 1978 parliamentary campaign, presidential elections were
analyzed. The choice of a parliamentary election for the 1970s is due to data constraints.
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difficult to compare over time. In the following, the content of the 12 categories is
specified. All categories have a clear direction, and actor’s stance towards them can
be either positive or negative. The abbreviations in brackets refer to the ones used in
the figures later on. Note that the differentiation between state-market, cultural and
residual issues is provided as an orientation and does not determine the empirical
analysis.
State vs. market issues
Welfare. Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state
retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment programs,
health care programs. Valence issues such as “against unemployment” or “against
recession” were dropped if there was no specification if this was to be achieved by
state intervention or by deregulation.
Environment (env). Protection of the environment, pollution taxes, against atomic
energy.
Budget. Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures, reduction
of taxes that have no effects on redistribution.
Economic liberalism (ecolib). Support for deregulation, for more competition, and for
privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed
measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distinguishing
criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protectionism in
agriculture and other sectors.
Cultural issues
Cultural liberalism (cultlib). Support for the goals of the New Social Movements,
with the exception of the environmental movement: Peace, solidarity with the
third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for cultural diversity,
international cooperation (except for the European Union), support for the United
Nations. Opposition to racism, for the right to abortion and euthanasia, against a
restrictive drug policy.
Negative: Cultural protectionism. Patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence
of tradition and national sovereignty, traditional moral values.
Europe. Support for European integration.
Culture. Support for education, culture, and research.
Immigration. Support of a tough immigration and integration policy, for the restriction
of the number of foreigners.
 Army. Support for the army and for a strong national defence, for nuclear weapons.
Support for NATO.
Security. Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political
corruption. Fight against national and international terrorism.
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Residual categories
Institutional reform (iref). Support for various institutional reforms such as the
extension of direct democratic rights, modifications in the structure of the political
system, federalism and decentralization, calls for the efficiency of government and
public administration, New Public Management.
Infrastructure (infra). Support for the improvement of the infrastructure (roads,
railways etc.).
The first step in the analysis is to determine the dimensionality of political space and
to identify the issue categories that structure oppositions in the party system in a given
election. The political offer is therefore analysed using the unfolding variant of
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) that allows a representation of parties and issues in
a low-dimensional space for each election. MDS allows objects to be represented
graphically according to measures of similarity or dissimilarity between them (Coxon
1982, Rabinowitz 1975). For this analysis, for each of the 12 categories, the mean
distance between the individual parties and the issues comprising the category has
been calculated. To give those relationships most weight that are based on a large
number of observations, a Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling (WMMDS) has
been used.6 There are always distortions between the “real” distances and their
graphical representation in the low-dimensional space resulting from the MDS, but
the weighting procedure ensures that the distances corresponding to salient
relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than less salient ones.
Furthermore, only categories are represented that total at least 3% of the sentences per
election. Parties with less than 30 actor-issue sentences are equally dropped from the
analysis.
The political space constituted by the parties and issues in each of the four
elections are presented in Figures 2a-d. In all four cases, the solution is clearly two-
dimensional.7 It has to be emphasized that the dimensions resulting from the MDS
analysis are not substantially meaningful. The only relevant information provided is
                                                 
6 Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling can be carried out using the algorithm Proxscal, which
is implemented in SPSS.
7 The move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the clearest
reduction in the Raw Stress statistic, which is a measure for goodness-of-fit. The Stress I statistic,
which is more appropriate for the estimation of the goodness-of-fit of the final configuration, is







Figures 2a-d: Political Space in France, 1978 (a), 1988 (b), 1995 (c), and 2002 (d). Positions of parties
and issue-categories (polarization in brackets)
Legend: front: Front National, Mouvement National Républicain (MNR); rpr: Rassemblement pour la
République; udf: Union pour la Démocratie Française, small center parties; mrg: Mouvement
des Radicaux de Gauche; psf: Parti Socialiste Français; pcf: Parti Communiste Français; ecolo:
Greens, ecological parties; rl: Radical left group.
the distance between the parties and the issue categories. This means that the solution
can be freely rotated. However, to facilitate the interpretation, it is possible to lay axes
into the distribution that are theoretically meaningful.
Identifying the relevant axes
In determining the axes, I apply two criteria. First of all, the opposition constituted by
the poles must make sense theoretically. Secondly, the categories constituting the
poles should lie at the extremes of the distribution, since this is an indication of
polarization, parties’ proximity to them varying considerably. In Figures 2a-d, a first
axis has been drawn between “welfare” and “economic liberalism” as a representation
of the distributional political conflict. All the configurations have been rotated to
make this axis lie horizontally in political space. This can be considered the traditional
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left-right divide, or, arguably, the political content of the traditional state-market
cleavage.
The second axis emerging is a cultural opposition. From 1978 on, one pole of this
axis is clearly constituted by the category “Cultural liberalism” that regroups the
issues relating to the goals of the New Social Movements, taken up by the libertarian
left in the 1970s. In 1978, no opposing pole is visible yet, and I have drawn no axis in
the first figure. In the three more recent elections, however, a clear counter-pole has
emerged: An anti-immigration stance, expressed by the category “immigration”. This
accords to the hypothesis of the transformation of the cultural divide in the late 1980s
and 1990s (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming, Bornschier 2005). This line can be interpreted
as an opposition between universalistic-libertarian und traditionalist-communitarian
values.
The next step is now to position voters in the parties’ political space according to
the constituting issue-categories for each axis in the four elections. In other words, I
use the political offer to define the dimensionality of political space, and not the
dimensions structuring voters’ attitudes. The issue-categories constituting the axes are
first of all those at the poles, as well as other categories characterized by a high
polarization and located on a line of opposition. Here, the criterion used is the
standard deviation of parties’ mean positions concerning the respective category. This
is indicated next to the name of the category in the figures.8 For the economic axis, the
relevant issue-categories are the same in all four elections: Welfare and Economic
liberalism.9
The cultural axis’ political content has been subject to change over time. In 1978, it
comprises environmental protection apart from Cultural liberalism, an issue that is
highly polarizing. In 1988, 1995 and 2002, oppositions around Cultural liberalism,
Immigration and Security always characterize the cultural divide. In two elections,
additional issues are included in the definition of the axis due to their salience:
                                                 
8 The possible range of the average positions is –1 to 1.
9 Budgetary rigor is also quite polarizing, but its classification is not straightforward. Theoretically,
it can be considered as belonging to the economic axis. However, according to its position in the
figures, it seems more closely associated with the cultural opposition, but this is theoretically
ambiguous. One could argue that general anti-statism is part of the cultural opposition. As pointed
out in the description of the categories, the budgetary rigor only comprises general stances in favor
of rolling back the state and cutting taxes, while all measures that explicitly have distributive
effects are attributed to the Welfare category. However, for the time being, I have not included
budgetary rigor in either of the two axes.
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European integration in 1988 and 1995, and Army in 1995.10 Support or opposition
for the Army is associated with the cultural axis in most countries (Bornschier 2005),
while support for European unification can be considered both an economic as well as
a cultural issue (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming). In economic terms, the opening of markets
within the EU is likely to produce winners and losers, since exit options are unevenly
distributed (Bartolini 2004b). Even more than being an economic issue, however, the
European project is part of a value opposition, since it follows a multicultural-
universalistic logic accepting difference, which in turn engenders opposition from
citizens holding more traditionalist-communitarian values. Inglehart (1977) has shown
early on that the materialist-post-materialist value clusters are important in
determining preferences for European integration, while Hooghe et al. (2002) have
shown that parties’ positions on the cultural divide (GAL-TAN-axis in their
terminology) are good predictors for their stance on European integration.
Consequently, that Europe is associated with the cultural divide is not only supported
empirically, but also makes sense theoretically. Having identified the categories of
issues that define the two axes, the next step is now to position voters according to
these categories.
Positioning the electorates in the parties’ political space
To determine the positions of the parties’ respective electorates, we have attempted to
operationalize the above categories using indicators from post-election surveys.11 Due
to the restricted number of questions relating to political issues in these surveys, it is
not always possible to operationalize all categories. Table 1 shows the relevant
categories per election and indicates for which of them issues are available. A listing
of the indicators used to construct the issue-categories can be found in the Appendix.
Where several issue questions related to the same category, they were combined into a
single index using factor analysis. Although the classification is theoretically defined,
                                                 
10 The categories Institutional reform and Culture were not taken into account (even if they were
polarized in a given election) because their content changes considerably from election to election,
making it difficult to link them theoretically to one of the two axes.
11 The datasets are available from Socio-Political Data Archive (www.cidsp.com/bdsp). The titles and
reference numbers of the surveys used are: Enquête post-électorale française, 1978 (Reference:
BDSP-CIDSP q0062), Enquête post-électorale française, 1988 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0601),
Enquête post-électorale française, 2002 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0891), Panel electoral français
2002.
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this also allows an estimation if the single variables measure the same dimension.
Single items were standardized in order to make them comparable with the factor
scores.
Table 1: Relevant issue-categories per election and those operationalized on the demand side
Welfare Ecolib Cultlib Env
1978 X X X –
Welfare Ecolib Cultlib Immigr Security Europe
1988 X X X X X X
Welfare Ecolib Cultlib Immigr Security Europe Army
1995 – X X X X X –
Welfare Ecolib Cultlib Immigr Security
2002 – X X X X
Having chosen and operationalized the issues relating to the two axes on the side of
the parties and on the side of the voters, the positions of parties and their voters on
each axis can now be calculated. The position of parties is calculated as their mean
position regarding the relevant issues. For each axis, I have excluded parties with less
than ten observations to ensure a certain reliability of the results.12 For the voters, the
issues constituting each axis were combined in a factor analysis, which produced one-
dimensional solutions in all cases. Individuals’ factor scores were then used to
determine the mean position of each party’s electorate. It is important to keep in mind
that proceeding this way, the correspondence between parties and voters can only be
judged in relative and not in absolute terms since the possible range of variation is
different in the two cases, and it is difficult if not impossible to make the two scales
strictly comparable.
In the following, starting with the economic axis, I compare the positions of parties
and voters in order to classify the elections according to the first two criteria of the
schema developed in the preceding section. The third criterion, the stability of
                                                 
12 On the economic axis, the Ecologists were excluded in 1978 and 1995, and on the cultural axis,
they are excluded in 1978 and 1995. On this same axis, the Radical left had to be excluded in 1978
and 2002, and the same applies for the MRG in 2002.
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alignments, will be assessed at the end of the discussion of each of the respective
axes.
Parties and voters on the economic divide
Figure 3 shows the respective positions of parties and voters on the economic axis. In
all the figures, a position on the left corresponds to a programmatic stance or
preferences in favour of the welfare state and against economic liberalism. A position
on the right represents the opposite set of preferences. Starting with the election of
1978, we find quite a high level of polarization on the side of the voters on this axis.
In contrast, parties’ positions do not diverge very much if we disregard the Front
National, which attained less than 1% of the votes in that election. Especially the
established parties of the right appear quite far away from their voters. On the right-
hand side of the party system, parties and voters are thus out of touch, corresponding
to a non-responsive party system. Voters who chose smaller parties are included in the
1978 figure under the “divers droite” category because they underscore a political
potential exists that is not mobilized by the established parties.13
                                                 
13 The “divers droite” and the corresponding category of electors who voted for various small parties
on the left (excluding the extreme left which forms a separate category) are not included in the
figures for the other election years since they are characterized by rather centrist positions.
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Figure 3: Positions of Parties and voters on the economic axis, 1978-2002
Legend: front: Front National, Mouvement National Républicain (MNR); rpr: Rassemblement pour la
République; udf: Union pour la Démocratie Française, small center parties; mrg: Mouvement des
Radicaux de Gauche; psf: Parti Socialiste Français; pcf: Parti Communiste Français; ecolo: Greens,
ecological parties; rl: Radical left group.
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As one can see, the Front National adopts a position suitable of mobilizing such a
potential, which corresponds well to the hypothesis that the Front National at the
beginning of its ascendancy mobilized many voters with neo-liberal preferences (e.g.,
Kitschelt, McGann 1995).
However, looking at the mean position of the Front National’s electorate, it is quite
plausible that already back then, part of its electorate is characterized by more leftist
positions on the economic axis, which other studies have shown to be the case from
1995 onwards (Perrineau 1997, Mayer 2002). This trend is confirmed from 1988 on.
On the distributive axis, the Front National’s electorate lies to the left of the
established parties of the right, the RPR and UDF. At the same time, the Front
National’s programmatic position varies quite strongly and does not always
correspond to the mean position of its voters. While it significantly moves to the left
in 1988, it lies slightly to the right of the UDF and RPR in 1995. In 2002, finally, it
clearly takes the most rightist position concerning the distributional conflict, even
though its electorate lies in the middle of the distribution.
Concerning the general correspondence between parties and voters, the elections of
1988, 1995 and 2002 exhibit a very similar picture to that of 1978: While the
electorate spans quite a large part of the political space concerning their distributive
preferences, this is not mirrored in the parties’ political offer, which pitches more to
the left. Thus, over all elections, the pattern is one of a non-responsive party system.
Some of the voters dissatisfied with the established right’s political stance concerning
the distributional conflict may have voted for the Front National. But at the same
time, the latter’s ambiguous position concerning the economic divide underlines that
its success does not seem to derive primarily from its neo-liberal appeals, as Kitschelt
and McGann (1995) had claimed. More plausibly, the Front National’s shifting
positions reflect the party’s difficulty in satisfying the preferences of a heterogeneous
electorate, where some segments are in favour of strong government intervention in
the economy, while others are resolutely in favour of a free-market, as Perrineau
(1997) and Mayer (2002) have shown. In the last election, the Front National has
moved back to the right. However, the strong component within its electorate holding
leftist economic preferences makes it doubtful that this represents a long-term
strategy.
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The overall picture changes slightly in 2002 in another respect as well. More so
than in previous years, the voters of the leftist parties are generally more centrist in
their positioning than the parties they voted for. Thus, while the parties of the right
remain unresponsive to the preferences of their constituency, the party system appears
over-polarized on the political left.
The stability of alignments along the economic divide and resulting types of
opposition
To determine the stability of alignments structured by a line of opposition, the third
element in my schema (Figure 1), I use two measures that are based on recall-
questions in the surveys used. Asking people which party they voted for in the prior
election is non unproblematic since declared choices are known to be inaccurate at
times, and I am conscious of the limitations of such an approach. However, the
alternative, using aggregate measures of volatility, is equally problematic. For the
present purposes, I present some preliminary results based on the declared party
choices of respondents in the antecedent election.14 In a later step, the analysis can be
refined by adjusting respondents declared party choices to the results actually
obtained by the parties in the respective elections, along the lines set out for example
by Swyngedouw et al. (2000).
For the economic divide, I have defined two blocks based on the traditional left-
right distinction, which is quite straightforward in France. The first measure expresses
the stability of voters’ preferences for a party of the right or the left block. Since
abstention from voting may be an antecedent to a reconfiguration of preferences, only
respondents who voted in both the recent and the preceding elections are counted as
stable. The fidelity to the left and right blocks is presented in Figure 4. The stability of
alignments on the left is in decline since 1978, and since 1988 is lower than that those
to the right block. Between 1995 and 2002 however, alignments on the right have
declined as well. Overall, however, levels of loyalty seem quite high and the
economic divide continues to exert a strong influence on partisan alignments.
                                                 
14 Except for the survey of 1978, where the question refers to the presidential elections of 1974, the
recall-questions refer to the preceding parliamentary elections (1986, 1993 and 1997, respectively).
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Figure 4: Stability of preferences for the left and right blocks (in percent)
The second indicator used is block-volatility, measured as the percentage of voters
who changed from one block to the opposing one. Here, non-voters are excluded from
the analysis and the percentage figures refer to voters alone. The results for the
economic divide are presented in Figure 5. As one can see, block-volatility was at its
lowest in 1988 and has been rising since. Putting together the three elements of the
schema presented in Figure 1, we can now draw some tentative conclusions regarding
the character of the economic divide within the French party system.
Figure 5: Volatility between the left and right blocks (in percent)
All elections under examination fall into the category of non-responsive party
systems, as we have seen. In terms of my schema, then, the declining stability of
partisan alignments and the rising levels of volatility indicate a shift from a situation
in which existing alignments check the emergence of new conflicts to one with a
40
higher potential for realignments to take place. Since mainly the established parties of
the right are unresponsive to their constituencies, voters’ preferences being on average
more free-market, it is primarily in this group that realignments may occur. Since they
cannot take the form of preferences shifting to a more pro-market party, because no
such party exists, the most likely scenario is a general decline of the importance of the
economic divide for voters of the moderate right. This may have already opened the
way for alignments to be more strongly structured by the cultural divide. The decline
of the stability of alignments within the right block points to this possibility.
Parties and voters on the cultural divide
Turning to the positions of parties and voters on the cultural axis in Figure 6, a
location to the left of the axis denotes a libertarian-universalistic stance in support of
Cultural liberalism and general openness, including supranational integration. An
opposition to these values and stances against further immigration define a location to
the right. In 1978, we find a situation of segmentation on the cultural axis,
characterized by high levels of polarization both on the side of the parties, as well as
among their electorates. This constellation is not very advantageous for the emergence
of new political actors. While the Front National took a clear and extreme position on
the cultural axis already in 1978, the position of its electorate suggests that the party
did not primarily mobilize on this axis at the beginning of its rise. Rather, the
constellation on the cultural divide is compatible with the thesis that the Front
National also mobilized on the traditional economic divide in its early years, gaining
support with its pro-market stance, as well as receiving protest votes.
In 1988, the situation has changed. In this year, where Le Pen gains over 14% of the
votes in the first round of the presidential election, the Front National appears to have
an electorate of its own. Both concerning its political offer, as well as regarding the
preferences of its voters, it lies at quite a distance from the established parties. While
the positions of the voters of the established parties are quite divergent, the parties
themselves are situated quite near to one another in this election. At the libertarian
pole of the axis, this is probably due to the absence of the Greens. As in other years,
they were not sufficiently present in the political debate in the two months preceding
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the election, and thus had to be excluded from the analysis due to the low number of
observations. The same applies for the Radical left, which primarily addresses
economic issues.
Hence, it is primarily the parties of the established right that are unresponsive to
their constituencies. This indicates the existence of a further potential to the right of
the centre of the cultural axis. The Front National taking a comparatively moderate
stance compared to the other elections, it seems quite well suited to mobilize this
potential. This general picture is confirmed in the later elections, with minor
differences between 1995 and 2002. In 1995, the party system is responsive to the
preferences of the voters – with or without the Front National and its electorate. In
other words, from 1988 on, the Front National mobilizes an electorate whose
preferences resemble their party’s political stance quite closely. Both the Front
National, as well as its voters are at the extremes on the cultural divide and they
strongly contribute to the segmented nature of opposition on this axis.
One difference concerns the correspondence between the positions of the RPR as
the main established right-wing party and that of its electorate. While positions match
in 1995, the Gaullists are clearly nearer to the libertarian pole of the divide in 2002,
again opening a potential for the Front National with its more extreme position. Of
course, the latter’s position is quite far away from the average RPR-voter, but is has to
be kept in mind that the mean positions mask quite divergent orientations at the
individual level. Thus, part of the RPR’s electorate may well be in reach of the Front
National. A more in-depth analysis of sub-groups within the electorate of the
established right-wing parties would be required to verify such a hypothesis.
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Figure 6: Positions of parties and voters on the cultural axis, 1978-2002
Legend: see Figure 3.
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The stability of alignments along the cultural opposition and its consequences for
emerging types of opposition
Some trends concerning the stability of alignments can serve to shed additional light
on the nature of the cultural divide. The difficulty here concerns the identification of
the opposing blocks along this dimension, which cannot rest on established criteria
such as those relating to the class cleavage and the economic divide. Looking at the
positions of parties in 1978 in Figure 6, the left-right divide is cross-cut be the fact
that the UDF is located in the libertarian spectrum, while the Communists (PCF) lie
close to the RPR, in the authoritarian domain, primarily due to the Communist’s
negative stance on environmental protection. However, this pattern is not reflected in
the positions of voters, nor is it reproduced in later elections.
Three features characterize the later elections as opposed to that of 1978. First of
all, the main parties of the moderate right and left are located relatively near to one
another and in the centre of the axis. Second, the parties and voters of the extreme left
are not generally located nearer to the libertarian pole than the moderate parties of the
left, and the Communists are also located near the centre. However, the electorate of
the Ecologists stands out for always being located at the libertarian pole of the cultural
axis. And thirdly, the voters of the Front National constitute a separate block from
1988 onwards, closely reflecting the positioning of the party itself.
Based on these observations, three blocks can be identified: An authoritarian block
represented by the Front National and its voters, a centre block, where most
established parties are located, and a libertarian block constituted by the Ecologists.
The existence of this last block is perhaps not so apparent at first sight, since the
Ecologists are only represented in the political offer in 2002, while the number of
observations is not sufficient to position them in the other years. However, the
electorate of the Ecologists is the one closest to the libertarian pole from 1988 on.
Furthermore, a joint analysis of the political offer across the elections of 1988, 1995
and 2002 confirms the hypothesis. In an MDS-Analysis confined to the cultural issues
(and weighting for the salience of categories), a one-dimensional solution is obtained
and the Ecologists emerge as the most libertarian-universalistic party (data not shown
here).
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For theoretical reasons as well, the Ecologists can be considered as the libertarian
counter-pole to the Front National. Green parties have emerged in the wake of the
mobilization of the New Social Movements of the 1970s, putting Social Democrat
parties under pressure to adapt (Hug 2001), and resulting in a first transformation of
the traditional left-right divide (Kitschelt 1994). The rise of right-wing populist parties
can be understood as a counter-movement to the universalistic position advocated by
the Ecologist and Social Democrat parties, and to the societal transformations pushed
through by the latter (Bornschier 2005), resulting in yet another transformation of the
left-right divide (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming).
In France, the Ecologists are clearly nearer to the libertarian pole than the
Socialists who have moved closer to the centre after 1978, as Figure 6 shows. Thus,
while the Greens are taken to represent the libertarian pole of the cultural divide, I
group the Socialists together with the other parties of the centre block. Parties other
than the Ecologists and the Front National are classified as belonging to the centre.15
While they take diverging positions on the economic axis, this is not the case
regarding the cultural divide. Accordingly, they can be considered a common block.
The blocks having been defined, we can now proceed to examining the stability of
alignments. Since the three blocks are only discernible from 1988 onwards, the
analysis starts there. The first measure used is the loyalty of voters. Again, only those
voters are considered loyal that recall having voted for a party belonging to one block
in the preceding parliamentary election and who voted for a party belonging to the
same block in the presidential election preceding the survey. Thus, not only wholesale
shifts in voting behaviour are taken to indicate a veining force of alignments, but also
rising levels of abstention within a block.
                                                 
15 Some of the minuscule formations competing in various elections advocate more clear-cut
positions on the cultural axis, and are not included in the centre block. These parties were also
excluded in the calculations of stability and volatility based on the voters’ political demand.
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Figure 7: Stability of preferences for the Front National, the Ecologists and the
centre block (in percent)
The first striking feature in Figure 7 is the extremely high level of party loyalty
exhibited by the electorate of the Front National. Around 80% of those who declare
having voted for it in the preceding election have done so again.16 On the other hand,
the cross-tabulations of actual and previous votes also show that in all elections,
considerable parts of the Front National’s electorate come from voters who previously
did not vote or voted for other parties. Nonetheless, these results show that at least
concerning the hard core of the Front National’s electors, the structure of opposition
is highly segmented.
The same cannot be said of the electors at the opposing pole of the axis, who voted
for the Ecologists. There, levels of loyalty are quite low. Between 1986 and 1988,
42% of its electorate is loyal to the Ecologists, and this level was not reached again.
Thus, the high levels of closure at the authoritarian pole of the cultural divide are not
found at the opposing libertarian pole. This is also reflected in the considerable levels
of volatility between the Ecologist and the centre blocks (Figure 8).
                                                 
16 This result has to be taken with a grain of salt, since the number of respondents who declare having
voted for the Front National in the preceding election is always lower than the number of those
who declare having done so in the more recent election, the one actually under examination. In this
preliminary analysis, I have not yet corrected for the effective voting shares of parties, which will
make the figures more reliable. However, the analysis by Swyngedouw et al. (2000), which
proceeds that way, using iterative proportional fitting, supports the finding of the Front National
exhibiting the highest levels of loyalty of all French parties between the elections of 1993 and
1995.
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Concerning the voters of the centre, they start out with levels of fidelity slightly
higher than those of Front National voters. However, the subsequent development
shows a steady decline in loyalty. As the levels of volatility in Figure 8 show, this
trend cannot be accounted for by less steady rates of participation alone. It is also due
to rising volatility at the authoritarian margin of the centre block. Together with the
declining levels of fidelity to the centre block, this points to ongoing processes of
realignment. Potential support for the Front National does not seem to be limited to
the hard core of authoritarian voters who already vote for it. Parts of the electorate of
the Gaullist RPR (now UMP) have preferences that are more authoritarian than their
party’s stance.
Figure 8: Volatility at the libertarian and authoritarian margins of the centre block
(in percent)
Summing up, the analysis of the cultural divide in France has shown a potential for a
culturally authoritarian party to exist from some point in the 1980s on. In 1978, this
potential was hardly present, and even if the Front National existed, it gained less than
1% of the votes. In this early election, those who voted for the Front National were
much closer to their party on the economic than on the cultural divide. In 1988, by
contrast, an authoritarian cultural potential was not only present, but already formed a
loyal constituency of the Front National. The analysis also shows that on the cultural
axis, with the possible exception of parts of the RPR’s electorate, the party system is
responsive to those who actually voted. The resulting structure of competition is one
of deep segmentation and shows a remarkable stability over the three elections.
Concerning the libertarian pole of the divide, the Ecologists’ electorate clearly
represents the counter-pole to that of the Front National. However, this has not
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resulted in strong loyalties to the Greens, and the border between the Ecologist and
centre electorates is highly fluid. Hence, the structure of opposition on the cultural
axis is actually characterized by a segmented opposition between two blocks: That of
the Front National and the rest. If this opposition persists, chances are that it will
result in a new cleavage. At the moment, however, the dividing line between the two
camps does not seem settled yet. While the stability of alignments is high concerning
the Front National’s electorate, loyalties to the centre block are in decline. Support for
the Front National has in fact attained its highest levels in 2002, but the findings
presented here also point to rising levels of abstention within the centre block. On
average, those who do not vote have rather centrist positions. However, a more in-
depth analysis of the social groups constituting the group of non-voters may very well
reveal further potentials for the Front National, the party that successfully mobilizes
citizens characterized by authoritarian and intolerant attitudes.
5. Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to develop an analytical model that links historical
cleavages with the conflicts structuring oppositions within party systems. To the
degree that established cleavages entail collective identities and provide cognitive
schemata for to interpretation of politics, they condition the room available for the
articulation of new conflicts that cut across the old divisions. I have therefore
proposed to differentiate cleavages as well as more short-term divides using three
criteria. The first is the degree of correspondence between the positions of parties and
the preferences of their voters. The second refers to the salience of a divide in terms of
the polarization of voters’ and parties’ positions. Finally, the stability of alignments is
taken to indicate the degree of closure characterizing the social groups underlying an
opposition.
Together, these criteria result in a typology of divisions that have varying
consequences for the emergence of new lines of opposition. I have then applied the
model to analyze structures of opposition within the French party system between
1978 and 2002. The empirical analysis of parties’ political offer reveals the existence
48
an economic and a cultural axis of conflict. The first corresponds to the traditional
state-market cleavage. While this cleavage continues to polarize voters, the parties of
the established right advocate policies that are more leftist than the preferences of
their voters. Thus, the party system lacks responsiveness and we find some evidence
here for the thesis according to which the convergence between left and right parties
has opened the political space for the populist right, as argued by Ignazi (1992, 2003).
In its early years, the Front National indeed seems to have mobilized along the
economic divide, but after moving to a more pro-welfare position in 1988, it appears
rather ill suited to profit from the prevailing constellation of conflict. Having moved
back towards the pro-market pole in 2002, its programmatic stance appears rather
ambiguous concerning the economic axis.
The Front National’s rise after 1978 is more intimately linked to the emergence of
a cultural division that opposes a universalistic-libertarian and an authoritarian-
communitarian position. While the libertarian pole of this axis is already visible in the
1970s, the authoritarian pole, constituted by the Front National, has developed from
the late 1980s onwards. This conforms to the thesis of the populist right as a
reactionary movement against the libertarian left (Bornschier 2005).
According to the typology developed in this paper, oppositions on the cultural axis
are of a segmented type, both voters and parties being characterized by high levels of
polarization. Both theoretically and empirically, three blocks can be distinguished on
the cultural divide: The Front National, the centre block, comprising the established
parties of the left and right, and the Ecologists as the most libertarian party. However,
high levels of volatility between the Ecologist and centre blocks show that the main
dividing line on the cultural axis runs between the Front National and the other
parties. This may in part be due to the fact that on the economic axis, the Ecologist
party is clearly positioned to the left of its electorate, making its success depend
heavily on the relative salience of the cultural divide.
The Front National, on the other hand, from 1988 on cannot be considered a
challenger to the established parties anymore, but instead constitutes an integral part
of the segmented pattern of opposition on the cultural axis. Strong loyalties
characterize the hard core of the Front National’s electorate, pointing to a high level
of closure at the authoritarian pole of the cultural axis. This renders improbable the
scenario of this divide vanishing in the near future. At the same time, sinking levels of
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fidelity of the voters of the centre may indicate that the cultural divide is eroding
loyalties based on the economic cleavage. For this reason, it appears premature to
consider the cultural divide a settled cleavage. Rising levels of volatility between the
centre block and the Front National point to ongoing processes of realignment
between the blocks. This hypothesis will have to be verified by an analysis of the
social structural make-up of the groups accounting for the flows between the two
blocks.
Meanwhile, the unresponsiveness of the established parties of the right to the
preferences of their constituencies – which are more resolutely free-market than the
parties’ stances – may well be contributing to a declining importance of the class
cleavage regarding voting choices, thereby permitting the cultural divide to gain
room. Sinking levels of loyalty to the economic blocks of the left and right, as well as
the rise in volatility between the blocks equally point to a growing permeability of the
class cleavage, even if loyalties remain at high levels.
If the hypothesis is correct that the declining importance of the economic divide
contributes to the salience of the cultural conflict, then this has important
consequences for the established parties’ possibilities of halting the success of the
populist right. Whether or not the authoritarian camp can gain further voters at the
expense of the centre block or remains a – albeit important – minority would not only
depend on their stances regarding cultural issues. Rather, by more adequately
reflecting the preferences of their voters on the economic axis, the established parties
of the right could halt the erosion of the latter’s salience, putting limits on the further
growth of the Front National.
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Appendix: List and classification of the items used from the post-election surveys
France 1978
var description category
t26 supprimer avantages pour réduire inégalités sociales welfare
t27 élargir le secteur nationalisé ecolib
t29 limiter augmentation du niveau de vie pour lutter contre
l’inflation
ecolib
t30 interdire les licenciements ecolib
t31 l’Etat doit-il intervenir dans la vie économique ? ecolib
t71 supprimer le droit de grève ? ecolib
t64 fier d’être français ? cultlib
t73 pouvoir prendre la pilule avant la majorité ? cultlib
t77 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique ? cultlib
t87 envoyer les enfants au catéchisme cultlib
France 1988
var description category
q1a6 Salaires égaux: n’encouragent pas à travailler ecolib
q4 Difficultés économiques: Etat doit-il contrôler entreprises ? ecolib
q31a2 Etat : devrait garantir revenu minimum welfare
q31a9 Rétablir impôt sur grandes fortunes welfare
q2a1 Couple non marié : condamnable ? cultlib
q2a2 Avortement : condamnable ? cultlib
q2a3 Infidélité : condamnable ? cultlib
q2a4 Homosexualité : condamnable ? cultlib
q31a6 Femme : faite pour élever les enfants ? cultlib
q31a7 Société : il faut une hiérarchie cultlib
q10 Rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique ? cultlib
q1a4 Fier d’être français cultlib
q31a5 Juifs ont trop de pouvoir en France cultlib
q31a8 Normal que les musulmans en France aient des mosquées cultlib
q1a9 Trop d’immigrés en France immigration
q31a3 On ne se sent plus chez soi comme avant immigration
q31a10 Rétablir la peine de mort security
France 1995
var description category
q36 priorité: compétitivité ou situation des salaries ecolib
q20a2 l’Etat intervient-il trop ou pas assez dans la vie économique ecolib
q7a1 trop d’immigrés en France immigration
q7a6 on ne se sent plus chez soi comme avant immigration
q7a3 homosexualité est acceptable cultlib
q7a5 normal que les musulmans en France aient des mosquées cultlib
q7a7 normal qu’une femme puisse avorter cultlib
q7a8 pas assez d’enseignement sur l’extermination des juifs cultlib
q22a1 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique cultlib
q20a1 rôle de la femme (à la maison ou même rôle que hommes) cultlib
q7a4 il faut rétablir la peine de mort security













France 2002, Wave 2
var description category
xq237 interdire les licenciements ecolib
xq239 Difficultés économiques: Etat doit-il contrôler
entreprises ?
ecolib
xq255 recherches sur le génôme humain cultlib
xq58 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique cultlib
xq39p2_4 les juifs ont trop de pouvoir en France cultlib
xq39p2_1 trop d’immigrés en France immigration
xq39p2_3 immigrés : source d’enrichissement culturel immigration
xq39p2_2 rétablir la peine de mort security
xq39p2_5 supprimer allocations aux familles de mineurs
délinquants
security
xq242 France dans UE : bonne ou mauvaise chose ? Europe
xq243_0 UE : peur que la France paie pour les autres ? Europe
xq243_1 UE : peur d’une baisse de la protection sociale ? Europe
xq243_2 UE : peur de perdre identité nationale ? Europe
xq243_3 UE : peur que France perde rôle international ? Europe
xq243_4 UE : peur d’une augmentation de l’immigration ? Europe
52
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